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Abstract 
 We tested the effect of sketching while providing a narrative on eliciting 
information, eliciting cues to deceit and lie detection in interpreter-absent and 
interpreter-present interviews. A total of 204 participants from the USA (Hispanic 
participants only), Russia, and the Republic of Korea were interviewed in their native 
language by native interviewers or by a British interviewer through an interpreter. 
Truth tellers discussed a trip they had made; liars fabricated a story about such a trip. 
Half of the participants were instructed to sketch while narrating, the other half 
received no instruction. Sketching resulted in more details provided. It also elicited 
cues to deceit: Complications and new details differentiated truth tellers from liars in 
the Sketching-present condition only. Liars and truth tellers were more correctly 
classified in the Sketching-present than in the Sketching-absent condition. More 
complications and more common knowledge details were reported without than with 
an interpreter. 
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General audience summary 
We tested the effect of sketching while providing a narrative on obtaining information 
from truth tellers and liars in interpreter-absent and interpreter-present interviews. We 
hypothesized that sketching while narrating would lead to more new information than 
just narrating, particularly in truth tellers. Sketching while narrating helps truth tellers 
to remember better and to report better what they remember. Liars may be unable to 
include as many details as truth tellers because they lack the imagination to fabricate 
these details or are unwilling to say much out of fear that this will give leads to 
investigators that they are lying. In the experiment, 204 participants from the USA 
(Hispanic participants only), Russia, and the Republic of Korea were interviewed in 
their native language by native interviewers or by a British interviewer through an 
interpreter. Truth tellers discussed a trip they had made during the last twelve months; 
liars fabricated a story about such a trip. Half of the participants were invited to 
sketch while narrating, whereas the other half of the participants were not requested to 
sketch. As predicted, sketching resulted in more new information, particularly 
amongst truth tellers. The presence of an interpreter did not affect these results. 
 
 
 
Keywords: interpreter, drawing, non-native speakers, information gathering, 
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Sketching as a Technique to Eliciting Information and Cues to Deceit  
in Interpreter-Based Interviews 
Verbal differences between truth tellers and liars are often small (DePaulo et 
al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011). Researchers therefore started to devise theory-
based methods to elicit or enhance verbal differences between truth tellers and liars 
(Vrij & Granhag, 2012, 2014). The general approach is to exploit differences between 
truth tellers and liars in how they report activities or events and then to develop 
methods to magnify those differences (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Vrij, Fisher, & 
Blank, 2017) 
A typical finding in deception research is that truth tellers provide more detail 
than liars (Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015; Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; 
Oberlader, Naefgen, Koppehele-Gossel, Quinten, Banse, & Schmidt, 2016). Liars 
lack the imagination and skills to convey the amount of detail that truth tellers convey 
(Vrij, 2008), or are reluctant to provide many details out of fear that such details may 
provide leads for investigators to check (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014a). One theory-
based method to capitalize on this difference is to encourage interviewees to provide 
more information. Truth tellers should take advantage of this and generate more 
information, whereas liars will be unable or reluctant to provide the same amount of 
additional information. In the current experiment, we examined the effect of the 
request to sketch while discussing an event on truth tellers’ and liars’ narratives. 
Drawing a sketch while narrating has been shown to increase the amount of 
information generated amongst truth tellers (Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2009; Leins, 
Fisher, Pludwinsky, Robertson, & Mueller, 2014; Mattison, Dando, & Omerod, 
2015). Sketches have also been used in deception research (e.g. Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 
2012; Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann, 2011; Roos af Hjelmsäter et al., 2014; Vrij et 
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al., 2010) but in those deception studies the interviewees did not speak while 
sketching. They did speak while narrating in the current experiment.  
 Sketching while narrating may elicit additional information in truth tellers for 
several reasons. First, sketching serves to reinstate context, which itself enhances 
recall (encoding specificity principle, Thomson & Tulving [1970] and Tulving & 
Thomson [1973]). Second, sketching, a visual output, is more compatible with 
visually experienced events. In alignment with the Cognitive Interview principle of 
“code compatible output” (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992), this should facilitate recalling 
visual or spatial information. Third, sketching probably slows down the output 
process, which would then afford the interviewee more time to think about the event. 
More time for retrieval is likely to enhance recall. Fourth, sketching implies a subtle 
request for more precise infromation than a verbal response. That is, when drawing a 
sketch, one must locate the sketched person/object in a specific location (i.e., put the 
person/object in a specific location in a room), a fact that might not be included in a 
verbal response (“Joe was there”—but not indicating where Joe was) (Vrij, Mann, 
Leal, & Fisher, 2012).  
 In the present experiment truth tellers and liars first answered some general 
questions about an event followed by a final, more specific, question. When 
answering the final question some participants were asked to draw a sketch and others 
were not. A request to sketch may enhance differences between truth tellers and liars 
in terms of details, particularly new details not yet mentioned before. Truth tellers’ 
memory of the event is likely to be richer than the made-up story liars have prepared 
to tell in advance or can spontaneously fabricate, which should lead to truth tellers 
reporting more new details when requested to sketch than liars. 
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We also examined specific types of detail: Complications and common 
knowledge details. Complications is one of the criteria included in the verbal veracity 
tool Criteria-Based Content Analysis (Köhnken & Steller, 1988; Steller & Köhnken, 
1989). A complication is an activity or event that someone describes which was not 
expected or planned (Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Vrij et al., 2017). If someone says that 
while driving to his holiday destination he had a flat tire en route, that he got lost, and 
that there was heavy traffic due to a road accident, he reports three complications. 
Complications are more likely to occur in truthful statements than in deceptive 
statements (Amado et al., 2015; Vrij et al., 2017). Making up complications requires 
imagination and many people lack such imagination (Vrij, 2008). In addition, liars 
prefer to keep their stories simple (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007) and 
including many complications does not constitute a simple story. The increased 
amount of detail that truth tellers are likely to report when they sketch may well 
include complications. These are the kind of detail that interviewees are likely to 
leave out when describing key aspects of activities because complications are often 
peripheral elements of a story (Vrij et al., 2017).  
 Common knowledge details refer to strongly invoked stereotypical knowledge 
about events (e.g. ‘We visited the Eiffel Tower. We went up with the elevator and had 
a lovely view over Paris’) (Vrij et al., 2017). Liars are more likely to include common 
knowledge details in their statements than truth tellers (Vrij et al., 2017).i Truth 
tellers, who have personal experiences of an event, are likely to report such unique 
experiences and when they do so the statement is no longer scripted. If liars do not 
have personal experiences of the event they report, they then will draw upon general 
knowledge to construe the event (Sporer, 2016).  Even if they have personal 
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experiences of the event, they may not report them due to their desire to keep their 
stories simple (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007). 
The use of an interpreter 
Investigators increasingly use interpreters in investigative interviews but 
experimental research examining the effect of the presence of interpreters on eliciting 
information and cues to deceit is scarce. A consistent finding in the few interpreter 
experiments is that interpreter-present interviews result in less information than 
interpreter-absent interviews (Ewens et al., 2016a, b, c, 2017; Vrij et al., 2017). 
Ewens et al. (2017) suggested two reasons for this. First, interpreters do not translate 
every detail the interviewee gives. Second, interviewees actually report less with an 
interpreter present (Ewens et al., 2017). There are two possible reasons for this. The 
interpreter’s interruptions perhaps disrupt the interviewee’s train of thought thereby 
making memory retrieval more difficult (Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014; Nelson & 
Goodmon, 2003). Alternatively, an interviewee may decide to be concise when an 
interpreter is present given the extra time it takes to communicate through an 
interpreter, similar to people being more concise when talking to a hard-of-hearing 
person (Ewens et al., 2017). 
We explored the effect of an interpreter on complications and common 
knowledge details. Vrij et al. (2017) found no effect of an interpreter on these 
variables but it is important to replicate this to test its robustness. We cannot rule out 
that the presence of an interpreter has an effect. If interviewees are more inclined to 
be concise in the presence of an interpreter, this could result in reporting fewer 
complications and more common knowledge details. Alternatively, interpreters may 
leave out complications as they are often peripheral elements of a story.  
Within-subjects comparisons 
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 Vrij (2016) recently argued for the development of within-subjects measures 
in which different responses made by the same interviewee during a single interview 
are compared. Truth tellers and liars may differ from each other in reporting details on 
a group basis, but individual differences in providing details makes it difficult to 
determine whether a single person is telling the truth or lying based on the amount of 
detail s/he provides (Nahari & Pazuelo, 2015; Nahari & Vrij, 2014). Individual 
differences play a lesser role in within-subjects comparisons in which different 
responses made by the same interviewee during a single interview are compared. To 
reduce differences across individuals, we therefore also calculated the proportion of 
new details (new details / total details) and the proportion of complications 
(complications / (complications + common knowledge details). 
Hypotheses 
 We hypothesized the following three main effects: 
- Hypothesis 1: Interviewees will provide more total details, more new details and 
more complications in the Sketching-present condition than in the Sketching-absent 
condition. 
- Hypothesis 2: Truth tellers will provide more total details and more new details, 
more complications, and fewer common knowledge details than liars and 
subsequently will obtain a higher proportion of complications than liars.  
-  Hypothesis 3: Interviewees will provide more total details and more new details in 
the interpreter-absent interviews than in the interpreter-present interviews. 
We further hypothesized the following two interaction effects: 
- Hypothesis 4: Truth tellers will provide more new details than liars, particularly in 
the sketch condition. Consequently, the proportion of new details will be higher in 
truth tellers than in liars, particularly in the sketch condition. 
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- Hypothesis 5: Truth tellers will provide more complications than liars, particularly 
in the sketch condition. Consequently, the proportion of complications will be higher 
in truth tellers than in liars, particularly in the sketch condition. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 204 University students (52 males, 147 females and five not 
indicated) took part in the study. Their age ranged from 18-39 years with an average 
age of M = 22.00 years (SD = 3.44). Participation took place in three different 
universities in the Republic of Korea, Russia and USA, and the background of the 
participants was Korean (n = 80), Russian (n = 79) and Hispanic (n = 45), 
respectively.  
Procedure 
 Recruitment, pre-condition selection form, preparation and pre-interview 
questionnaire.  
 We used the same procedure as Vrij et al. (2017). Participants were recruited 
via an advert on the university intranets and advertisement leaflets distributed in 
university buildings. The advert explained that the experiment would require 
participants to tell the truth or lie about a trip away that they may (or may not) have 
taken within the last year. We decided upon “last year” so that truth tellers would still 
remember many details about their trip and liars could not easily say ‘I can’t 
remember’ when answering the questions.  On arrival to the corresponding university, 
participants received a participant information sheet and signed an informed consent 
form. Both truth tellers and liars then completed a selection form that contained six 
cities that the researchers thought the participants may have visited during the past 
year. (Different cities were used for the three different countries.) The six cities were 
Using drawings in Interpreter-based Interviews 
 
11 
included on the selection form so that we would obtain some kind of standardization 
of the cities discussed in the study. The participants were also asked to write down the 
names of two other cities they had visited during the past year. We did so because if 
truth tellers had not been to any of the six cities mentioned on the selection form in 
the past twelve months, they could discuss in the interview one of these two 
additional cities.  
For each city the participants indicated (a) whether they had been there during 
the last twelve months, (b) when they had been there during the last twelve months, 
(c) for how long they stayed there, and (d) whether they have lived there. For truth 
tellers, the experimenter selected one of the six cities where the participant had stayed 
during the last twelve months for at least two nights but had never lived there. In case 
a truth teller had stayed in only one of those six cities, that particularly city was 
chosen. In case a truth teller had stayed in more than one of these six cities the 
experimenter chose a city, ideally one that had not been discussed by (too) many truth 
tellers before so that we would obtain a variety of cities being discussed. In case a 
truth teller had not been to any of the six cities, the experimenter selected one of the 
additional cities that the truth teller had listed on the selection form. Truth tellers were 
informed that they would be interviewed about this selected city (city X) and asked to 
answer the questions truthfully. For liars, the experimenter selected either one of the 
six cities on the selection form where the liar had never been in his/her life before, or 
selected a city not on the list but which was discussed by a truth teller during an 
interview (after checking that the liar had never been to this city before). In other 
words, the truth tellers’ and liars’ cities were matched. Liars were informed that they 
would be interviewed about city X and that they had to pretend to have stayed there 
for at least two nights during a trip made during the last twelve months. Across all 
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102 truth tellers, more than twenty cities were used. Liars were also interviewed about 
these cities.  
Truth tellers and liars were then left with a computer with internet access and 
told they had twenty minutes to prepare for their interview, or to inform the 
experimenter if they were ready before that time. The participants were told that they 
were allowed to make notes while doing their research. Truth tellers and liars were 
told that it was important to be convincing because, if they did not appear convincing, 
they would be asked to write a statement about what they told the interviewer in the 
interview. In a pre-interview questionnaire the truth tellers and liars rated their 
thoroughness of preparation via three items: (1) shallow to (7) thorough; (1) 
insufficient to (7) sufficient; and (1) poor to (7) good. The answers to the three 
questions were averaged (Cronbach’s alpha = .81) and the variable is called 
‘thoroughness’. They were also asked whether they thought they were given enough 
time to prepare themselves with the following question: ‘Do you think the amount of 
time you were given to prepare was: (1) insufficient to (7) sufficient.  
Experimental conditions. 
Participants were allocated randomly to one of the eight experimental cells. A total of 
102 participants were allocated to the truth condition and 102 to the lie condition; 100 
to the Sketching-absent condition and 104 to the Sketching-present condition; and 101 
to the Interpreter-absent condition and 103 to the Interpreter-present condition. 
Individual cell sizes varied from 24 (two cells) to 27 (two cells). A power analysis 
revealed that a total of 25 participants would be required in each group for the study 
to have sufficient statistical power (.993) and a large effect size (ηp2 = .138). 
 In total, three interpreters were used in the study, one in each country. These 
were the same interpreters as used in Vrij et al. (2017). The Korean and Hispanic 
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interpreters were professional interpreters; the Russian interpreter spoke fluent 
English and had a Masters degree that included English language. The interpreters 
were instructed to use a long consecutive interpreter style (Viezzi, 2012): They 
interpreted chunks of information uttered by the participant rather than interpreting 
sentence by sentence, and took notes during the interview. All interpreters had 
experience in using this type of interpreter style.  
 In the interpreter condition, one British interviewer was used, whereas in the 
non-interpreter condition one Russian, one Korean and one Hispanic interviewer were 
used. The British, Russian and Korean interviewers were the same as in Vrij et al. 
(2017). Prior to the experiment the British interviewer (who is a very experienced 
interviewer and has interviewed in many experiments before) instructed the other 
interviewers how to conduct the interview. They were instructed to be friendly and 
not to interrupt the interviewee. Several practice sessions took place until the British 
interviewer was satisfied with the interview style of the interviewer. That is, she was 
satisfied with the demeanour of the interviewers (appeared friendly) and the 
opportunities they gave to the interviewees to talk (no interruptions). To assess 
consistency in interview style between the interpreter and non-interpreter conditions, 
participants were asked to assess in a post-questionnaire the rapport they experienced 
with the interviewer (see below). All interpreters and interviewers were blind to the 
veracity condition and hypotheses.  
 We did not predict any effects for nationality of the participants. In addition, 
not only nationality but also interviewer and interpreter varied along with nationality. 
We wanted to control for the possible effects of this, and therefore included site as a 
covariate in the hypotheses testing analyses. 
 The interview. 
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Prior to the interview the experimenter told the interviewer about which city to 
interview the participant. The interviewer was unaware of the veracity status of the 
participant. To make the interviewee feel comfortable and to avoid floor effects in 
establishing rapport interviewees were offered a glass of water from the interviewer, 
as offering something helps rapport building (reciprocation principle, Cialdini, 2007).  
The interviewer started by asking five general questions about the planning 
and execution of the trip (e.g. “Please tell me in as much detail as possible everything 
you did when you were at _________ from the moment you arrived to the moment 
you left” and “Tell me in as much detail as possible everything you did to plan this 
trip, e.g. organising transport, accommodation, where to visit and so on”). Since the 
sketching manipulation was not yet introduced when answering these five questions, 
the results of these five questions will not be discussed.ii In the sixth and final 
question the sketching manipulation was introduced. The question was introduced by 
the following request: “I want you now to think about the best thing that happened 
when you were there. Take a few moments to picture in your mind where you were 
and what you saw at that time, including who you were with, descriptions of objects 
and locations, and the sequence of actions and please let me know when you have 
done this”. After this request the actual question was asked: “Now please tell me 
everything you remember but while doing this make a sketch of what you could see” 
(Sketching-present condition); “Now please tell me everything you remember” 
(Sketching-absent condition). We label this question the ‘best moment’ question. The 
participants were given one sheet of A3-sized paper and a set of coloured pencils to 
make the sketch. They were also reassured that the quality of their drawing did not 
matter. While the interviewee sketched and talked the interpreter took notes of what 
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the interviewee said and conveyed this information to the interviewer at regular times, 
during which the interviewee stayed quiet.  
The interviews were video (interviewees only) and audio recorded and the 
English speech in the audiotapes was subsequently transcribed. In other words, in the 
Interpreter-present condition the speech from the interpreter was transcribed. We did 
this because it is this speech that interviewers will understand in real life interviews 
with interpreters. In a study where in the Interpreter-present condition the 
interviewee’s and interpreter’s speech were both analysed, virtual identical findings 
emerged in the interviewee’s and interpreter’s speech in terms of eliciting information 
and cues to deceit (Ewens et al., 2017). 
Post-interview questionnaire. 
After the interview, participants completed a post-interview questionnaire, 
which was translated and completed in the participant’s native language. The 
questionnaire measured motivation to perform well during the interview (measured on 
a 5-point Likert scale from 1 = not at all motivated to 5 = very motivated). In 
addition, the participants were also asked to indicate the extent to which they told the 
truth when answering the best moment question on an 11 point Likert scales ranging 
from 0% to 100%. 
Rapport was measured via the nine items Interaction Questionnaire (Vallano 
& Schreiber Compo, 2011).  Participants rated the interviewer on 7-point scales 
ranging from [1] not at all to [7] extremely on nine characteristics such as smooth, 
bored, engrossed, and involved (Cronbach’s alpha = .81).  
For those participants who were asked to sketch we asked about their 
experiences. Participants were asked the following four questions that they answered 
on 7-point scales ranging from [1] not at all to [7] very much so: (a) ‘Sketching while 
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narrating was easy to do’, (b) ‘Sketching while narrating was difficult to do’, (c) 
‘Sketching while narrating made it easier for me to think what I wanted to say’, (d) 
‘Sketching while narrating made it more difficult for me to think what I wanted to 
say’. Questions two and four were recoded and the four questions were averaged to 
form the cluster labelled “easy to sketch and talk” (Cronbach’s alpha = .79). 
Coding 
All coders were blind to the hypotheses and Veracity condition. 
 Detail.  
 The coders were taught the coding scheme by the first author who has more 
than twenty years of experience in coding detail. A coder first read the transcripts and 
coded each detail in the interview. A detail is in this study defined as a unit of 
information about the trip the interviewee allegedly had made. To give an example, 
the following answer has seven details: “I'm also drawing a plaza that is in front of the 
cathedral. There was a large fountain. It had a lot of seats, or benches”. Each detail in 
the answer was coded only once; thus repetitions were not coded. A second coder 
coded a random sample of 40 transcripts. Inter-rater reliability between the two 
coders, using the two-way random effects model measuring consistency, was high 
(Single Measures ICC = .89). The first coder than coded to what extent each detail 
reported in the ‘best moment’ question was new, that is, not mentioned in the earlier 
part of the interview (Single Measures ICC = .95).  
 Two coders coded independently from each other complications and common 
knowledge details in all transcripts. A complication is an activity or event that 
someone describes which was not expected or planned (Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Vrij 
et al., 2017). Example of complications are (a) “And my mum was calling me but I 
still wasn't coming, I was still in the water”; (b) “So I put this cream on my body but 
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er I didn't do it quite well, so I still burned my shoulders”; and (c) “It was a large 
crowd. We came quite late, so we were looking for quite some time to find a place 
where to stand”. Common knowledge details refer to strongly invoked stereotypical 
knowledge about events (Vrij et al., 2017). Examples of common knowledge details 
are: (d) “the best er moment was er my, like spending time at this central square, and 
um, in my thoughts I was also there, and all my closest people, my relatives were with 
me and my girlfriend also”, (e) “You see all this beauty around you and um, all this 
cliff um walls, covered with um portraits of saints and er, you feel this special smell – 
in church” and (f) “we like um, just went to the cafe after this and er we were drinking 
coffee and we weren't talking at all, and we just w-were feeling very very good”. 
 Inter-rater reliability between the two coders, using the two-way random 
effects model measuring consistency, was good for complications (Average 
Measures, Intraclass correlation coefficient, ICC = .87) and satisfactory (but not 
strong) for common knowledge details (Average Measures ICC = .64). Disagreements 
were resolved between the two coders. Disagreements typically occurred because one 
coder missed a cue.  
Results 
Preparation thoroughness and preparation time 
 Two oneway ANOVAs with Veracity as factor and preparation thoroughness 
and preparation time as dependent variable revealed that truth tellers (M = 4.92, SD = 
1.07, 95% CI [4.71, 5.1]) rated their preparation as more thorough than liars (M = 
4.17, SD = 0.99, 95% CI [3.97, 4.37]), F(1, 202) = 26.82, p < .001, d = 0.73. Truth 
tellers (M = 5.93, SD = 1.49, 95% CI [5.61, 6.26]) also believed more than liars (M = 
4.93, SD = 1.79, 95% CI [4.61, 5.25]) that they were given sufficient time to prepare 
themselves for the interview, F(1, 202) = 18.83, p < .001, d = 0.75. These findings are 
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not surprising: Truth tellers were requested to recall a true event whereas liars had to 
fabricate a story. We introduced preparation thoroughness and preparation time as 
covariates in the hypotheses testing analyses.  
Easy to sketch and talk 
 A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interpreter) ANOVA with easy to sketch and talk as 
dependent variable revealed a main effect for Veracity, F(1, 100) = 6.50, p = .012, d = 
0.50. Truth tellers found it easier to sketch and talk (M = 4.01, SD = 1.36, 95% CI 
[3.59, 4.42]) than liars (M = 3.26, SD = 1.64, 95% CI [2.83, 3.67]). The Interpreter 
main effect, F(1, 100) = 0.01, p = .930, d = 0.01, and Veracity X Interpreter 
interaction effect, F(1, 100) = 1.52, p = .221, partial eta2 = 0.015, were not 
significant. The mean scores indicate that participants did not find this task easy. 
Actually, 40.0% of truth tellers and 61.1% of liars reported that they found it difficult 
(mean lower than four). 
Manipulation Checks 
 Rapport.  
 An ANOVA with Interpreter as factor and rapport with the interviewer as 
dependent variable did not show a difference in rapport between the two conditions, 
F(1, 202) = 2.77, p = .097, d = 0.23. The grand mean revealed that the interviewees 
perceived the rapport with the interviewer as very good (M = 5.60, SD = .82 on a 7-
point scale). 
Motivation, time since the trip was made, and percentage truth telling 
while sketching.  
The grand mean showed that the participants were motivated to perform well 
during the interview (M = 4.01, SD = .72 on a 5-point scale). A 2 (Veracity) X 2 
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(Sketch) X 2 (Interpreter) ANOVA revealed no significant main or interaction effects, 
all F’s < 3.41, all p’s > .066.  
Truth tellers were asked on the pre-condition selection form when they made 
the trip they discussed. On average this trip was made M = 5. 48 months prior to the 
interview (SD  = 2.96). This variable was not correlated with any of the main 
dependent variables in the study (total detail, new detail, proportion new detail, 
complications, common knowledge details, or ratio of complications), all r’s < .11, all 
p’s > .26). 
Truth tellers told the truth significantly more (M = 95.88, SD = 12.45, 95% CI 
[91.56,100.25]) than liars (M = 22.08, SD = 29.93, 95% CI [17.43,26.12]), F(1, 196) 
= 566.83, p < .001, d = 3.48), which means that the manipulation was successful. In 
addition, participants were somewhat more truthful without sketching (M = 61.36, SD 
= 42.27, 95% CI [57.59,66.36]) than when sketching (M = 56.69, SD = 44.71, 95% CI 
[51.40,60.00]), F(1, 196) = 4.06, p = .045, d = .11). The Veracity X Interpreter 
interaction effect was also significant, F(1, 196) = 10.69, p = .001, partial eta2 = .05). 
The presence of an interpreter had no effect on truth tellers, F(1, 100) = 3.37, p = 
.069, d = .41), but did affect liars, F(1, 100) = 7.53, p = .007, d = .56). Liars 
interviewed with an interpreter reported to have been more truthful (M = 29.66, SD = 
33.85, 95% CI [5.66,22.10]) than liars interviewed without an interpreter (M = 13.88, 
SD = 22.62, 95% CI [21.75,37.56]). All other effects were not significant, all F’s < 
3.45, all p’s > .064 
Hypothesis Testing  
A 2 (Sketch) X 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interpreter) MANCOVA was conducted 
with the six variables listed in Table 1 as dependent variables and preparation 
thoroughness, preparation time, and site as covariates. At a multivariate level main 
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effects emerged for Sketching, F(6, 188) = 4.61, p < .001, partial eta2 = .13, Veracity, 
F(6, 188) = 5.54, p < .001, partial eta2 = .15, and Interpreter, F(6, 188) = 3.53, p = 
.002, partial eta2 = .10. At a multivariate level, the Sketch X Veracity interaction 
effect, F(6, 188) = 3.50, p = .003, partial eta2 = .10 and Veracity X Interpreter 
interaction effect, F(6, 188) = 3.31, p = .004, partial eta2 = .09, were significant, 
whereas the Sketch X Interpreter interaction effect, F(6, 188) = 1.69, p = .126, partial 
eta2 = .05, and the Sketch X Veracity X Interpreter interaction effect, F(6, 188) = 
0.82, p = .559, partial eta2 = .02, were not significant. The multivariate effect for the 
covariate site was significant F(6, 188) = 4.22, p = .001, partial eta2 = .12, whereas 
those for preparation thoroughness F(6, 188) = 0.92, p = .479, partial eta2 = .03 and 
preparation time F(6, 188) = 1.51, p = .178, partial eta2 = .05 were not. 
 Main effects. 
Regarding the Sketch main effect, significant univariate effects emerged for 
total details, F(1, 193) = 22.39, p < .001, d = .68, new details, F(1, 193) = 18.29, p < 
.001, d = .60, complications, F(1, 193) = 13.65, p < .001, d = .51, and proportion of 
complications, F(1, 193) = 4.16, p = .043, d = .29. More total details were reported in 
the Sketching-present condition (M = 27.47, SD = 16.20, 95% CI [25.03,29.91]) than 
in the Sketching-absent condition (M = 19.26, SD = 8.11, 95% CI [16.61,21.59]); also 
more new details were reported in the Sketching-present condition (M = 20.58, SD = 
15.05, 95% CI [18.17,22.88]) than in the Sketching-absent condition (M = 13.32, SD 
= 9.24, 95% CI [10.82,15.62]), and more complications were reported in the 
Sketching-present condition (M = 1.79, SD = 1.77, 95% CI [1.50,2.06]) than in the 
Sketching-absent condition (M = 1.04, SD = 1.16, 95% CI [0.75,1.32]). These results 
support Hypothesis 1. Finally, the proportion of complications was higher in the 
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Sketching-present condition (M = 0.66, SD = 0.38, 95% CI [0.59,0.73]) than in the 
Sketching-absent condition (M = 0.55, SD = 0.39, 95% CI [0.48,0.63]). 
Table 1 about here 
All the statistical information regarding the Veracity main effect is presented 
in Table 1. In terms of detail, truth tellers reported more new details and obtained a 
higher proportion of new details than liars. In terms of the remaining variables, truth 
tellers reported more complications and fewer common knowledge details than liars, 
and the proportion of complications was also higher for truth tellers than for liars. 
With the exception of the variable total details, these findings support Hypothesis 2.  
Regarding the Interpreter effect, significant univariate effects emerged for 
complications, F(1, 193) = 7.66, p = .006, d = 0.38 and common knowledge details, 
F(1, 193) = 7.00, p = .010, d = .30. More complications were reported without (M = 
1.71, SD = 1.80, 95% CI [1.41,1.97]) than with an interpreter (M = 1.14, SD = 1.19, 
95% CI [0.85,1.41]) and more common knowledge details were reported without (M 
= 0.69, SD = 0.67, 95% CI [0.59,0.81]) than with an interpreter (M = 0.50, SD = 0.58, 
95% CI [0.39,0.61]). Since the effect for total details, F(1, 193) = 0.39, p = .534, d = 
.09, and new details, F(1, 193) = 0.58, p = .448, d = .09, were not significant, 
Hypothesis 3 was rejected. 
 Interaction effects. 
At a univariate level, the Sketch X Veracity effect for new details was 
significant, F(1, 193) = 4.65, p = .032, partial eta2 = .024. In the Sketching-absent 
condition, truth tellers (M = 13.47, SD = 7.62, 95% CI [10.69,16.28]) and liars (M = 
13.18, SD = 10.64, 95% CI [10.43,15.99]) gave a similar amount of new details, F(1, 
95) = 0.03, p = .876, d = .03. However, in the Sketching-present condition, truth 
tellers (M = 24.34, SD = 15.61, 95% CI [20.41,28.47]) provided more new details 
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than liars (M = 16.67, SD = 13.51, 95% CI [12.45,20.67]), F(1, 99) = 6.86, p = .010, d 
= .53. The effect for proportion new details was not significant, F(1, 193) = 0.86, p = 
.356, partial eta2 = .004. This partly supports Hypothesis 4.  
 The Sketch X Veracity effect for complications was not significant, F(1, 193) 
= 3.76, p = .054, partial eta2 = .019, but this interaction effect refers to any type of 
interaction. As we predicted a directional effect with specific group differences based 
on theory and research in Hypothesis 5, a more informative test of Hypothesis 5 is to 
statistically test for significant differences between truth tellers and liars in each of the 
two Sketch conditions and to compare the groups' effect sizes to understand the 
magnitude of differences between truth telling pairs and lying pairs in these two 
Sketch conditions (e.g. Nahari & Ben-Shakhar, 2011; Shaw et al., 2015; Vrij et al., 
2017). See for the relevance of interpreting d-values, du Prel, Hommel, Röhrig, and 
Blettner (2009) and Fritz, Morris, and Richler (2012). In the Sketching-absent 
condition, truth tellers (M = 1.10, SD = 1.16, 95% CI [10.69,16.28]) and liars (M = 
0.98, SD = 1.17, 95% CI [10.43,15.99]) gave a similar amount of complications, F(1, 
95) = 0.62, p = .435, d = .10. However, in the Sketching-present condition, truth 
tellers (M = 2.25, SD = 1.84, 95% CI [20.41,28.47]) provided more complications 
than liars (M = 1.31, SD = 1.57, 95% CI [12.45,20.67]), F(1, 99) = 8.58, p = .004, d = 
.55. In other words, the effect size was much larger in the Sketching-present condition 
(d = .55) than in the Sketching-absent condition (d = .10) and the effect was 
significant only in the Sketching-present condition. These findings support 
Hypothesis 5. The effect for proportion complications was not significant, F(1, 193) = 
0.04, p = .843, partial eta2 = .000. 
At a univariate level, the Interpreter X Veracity interaction effect for common 
knowledge details was significant, F(1, 193) = 12.60, p < .001, partial eta2 = .06. In 
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the Interpreter-absent condition, truth tellers (M = 0.38, SD = 0.57, 95% CI 
[0,16.0.51]) gave fewer common knowledge details than liars (M = 1.02, SD = 0.63, 
95% CI [0.89,1.25]), F(1, 96) = 29.29, p < .001, d = 1.07. In the Interpreter-present 
condition, however, truth tellers (M = 0.44, SD = 0.58, 95% CI [0.29,0.58]) and liars 
(M = 0.55, SD = 0.57, 95% CI [0.41,0.69]) provided a similar amount of common 
knowledge details, F(1, 98) = 1.15, p = .287, d = .19. 
At a multivariate level, no other effects were significant, F’s < 1.51, p’s > .17.  
 Discriminant Analyses. 
Table 2 about here 
 We conducted a series of discriminant analyses to distinguish between truthful 
and deceptive interviewees in the Sketching-absent and Sketching-present conditions 
separately. In all cases, the objective group belonging (truthful versus deceptive) was 
the classifying variable and we present the cross-validation ‘leave-one-out’ results.  
Cross-validation assesses the accuracy of a statistical model across different samples, 
an important step in generalisation (Field, 2009). We ran eight analyses and each 
analysis included one of the eight variables listed in Table 2 as predictor. We focused 
on new detail and complications (including the proportion scores in which they are 
included), because these two variables yielded differential Veracity effects in the two 
Sketch conditions (e.g. Sketch X Veracity interaction effect). All statistical 
information is reported in Table 2. 
 Table 2 shows that complications was a better predictor of Veracity than new 
details. In the Sketching-present condition complications and the proportion of 
complications yielded similar effects but in the Sketching-absent condition, the 
proportion of complications variable was a better predictor of Veracity than the 
complications variable.  Finally, the Sketching-present condition resulted in more 
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accurate classifications of truth tellers and liars than the Sketching-absent condition, 
supporting Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
Discussion  
  We found three positive effects of sketching while providing a narrative about 
an event. First, it elicited more information. Obtaining as much detail as possible is a 
core aspect of an investigative interview (Fisher, 2010), and the request to sketch thus 
helps investigators to achieve this aim. Second, it elicited cues to deceit as new details 
and complications differentiated truth tellers from liars in the Sketching-present 
condition only. Third, it facilitated lie detection as the correct classifications of truth 
tellers and liars were somewhat higher in the Sketching-present condition than in the 
Sketching-absent condition.  
 We replicated Vrij et al.’s (2017) findings that (a) truth tellers report more 
complications than liars, (b) liars report more common knowledge details than truth 
tellers and (c) the proportion of complications is higher amongst truth tellers than 
liars. The combination of truthfulness (complications) and lying (knowledge details) 
is particularly useful as it allows us to calculate a within-subjects measure (the 
proportion of complications equals the proportion of cues to truthfulness). This 
within-subjects measure resulted in superior classification rates, albeit in the 
Sketching-absent condition only. Practitioners prefer within-subjects measures (Vrij, 
2016). Of course, within-subjects measures would be most effective if truth tellers 
and liars display truly different response patterns. That is, if truth tellers always 
include more complications than common knowledge details in their statements and 
liars always include more common knowledge details than complications in their 
statements. This is not the case and all that can be concluded is that truth tellers 
included a higher proportion of complications in their statements than liars. Yet, the 
Using drawings in Interpreter-based Interviews 
 
25 
benefit of using within-subject measures compared to between-subjects measures still 
exists. If just complications is considered, the problem arises that it will not only be 
affected by Veracity but also by individual differences, such as being naturally 
detailed and elaborative. Individual differences play a lesser role in within-subjects 
comparisons, because it is no longer relevant how many complications someone 
provides (which could be influenced by being naturally detailed and elaborative). 
Instead, it becomes relevant how many complications in relation to common 
knowledge details are included (more likely to be influenced by Veracity). 
 The findings for the presence of an Interpreter were, in part, puzzling. 
Compared to Interpreter-absent interviews, Interpreter-present interviews resulted in 
fewer complications (which could be predicted, see Introduction) but also in fewer 
common knowledge details. A possible explanation for the common knowledge 
details finding is that interviewees have more opportunity to think during an 
Interpreter-present than during an Interpreter-absent interview because they can think 
when the interpreter translates their responses. Perhaps during this enhanced thinking 
time they fabricated details that made their replies less scripted, resulting in fewer 
common knowledge details. In addition, in contrast to the Interpreter experiments 
carried out so far, it did not negatively affect the amount of information provided. We 
cannot explain this either, also because in the first part of the interview, which is not 
discussed in this paper, the presence of an interpreter did not affect the amount of 
information provided either.  
 Although the use of common knowledge details did differentiate truth tellers 
from liars in Interpreter-absent interviews, this was not the case anymore in 
Interpreter-present interviews. In other words, the presence of an interpreter made one 
cue to deceit disappear. Although truth tellers reported a similar amount of common 
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knowledge details in Interpreter-absent (M = 0.38) and Interpreter-present (M = 0.44) 
interviews, liars reported more common knowledge details in Interpreter-absent (M = 
1.02) than in Interpreter-present (M = 0.55) interviews. Interviewees have more 
opportunity to think during an Interpreter-present than during an Interpreter-absent 
interview because they can think when the interpreter translates their responses. 
Perhaps liars used the opportunity to formulate less scripted responses. Apart from 
this effect, the findings for the use of an interpreter were positive: It did not affect the 
information provided and it had no effect on the instruction to sketch which means 
that sketches can be used in both Interpreter-absent and Interpreter-present interviews.   
Methodological Consideration 
Three methodological issue merits attention. First, the experiment truth tellers 
were given the opportunity to prepare themselves. By doing this we avoided a 
confound between veracity and preparation, as we also gave liars the opportunity to 
prepare themselves. We believe that the advantage of avoiding a confound outweighs 
this disadvantage. Also, good interviewing involves giving interviewees ample 
opportunity to think about the event they are interviewed about (Fisher, 2010). 
Second, people can tell many types of lie, not just the outright lie the liars told 
in the present experiment. We believe that the findings of this paper can be 
generalized to most outright lies, but caution is needed when other types of lie are 
taken into account. We do not consider this to be problematic because we are not 
aware of any reliable lie detection tool that can be used at all times. The method 
introduced in this paper is probably unsuitable for detecting embedded lies or 
omissions, but for such lies other tools are available. In embedded lies most of the 
information someone reports is true except a small but crucial detail (someone admits 
being present at the crime scene but denies involvement in the crime, or someone 
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describes a true experience but lies about exactly when the event took place). In 
omissions the entire story is true but someone deliberately leaves out a crucial event 
or activity (someone truthfully describes a meeting but leaves out the presence of one 
crucial activity: Committing the crime). Some embedded lies are easier to detect than 
others. The ‘being present but denying involvement’ lie is challenging, but someone 
who lies about the timing when the experience took place is unlikely to be able to 
provide checkable details that conclusively demonstrate that s/he experienced the 
event at the time s/he claimed (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014a, b). For detecting 
omissions, it is probably necessary for investigators to have some evidence related to 
the crime. They can then compare the interviewee’s story with the available evidence 
and exploit discrepancies by employing the Strategic Use of Evidence technique 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2015).  
Third, the ICC for common knowledge details was satisfactory but not strong 
(ICC =  .64). Vrij et al. (2017) reported common knowledge details for the first time 
and achieved exactly the same inter-rater reliability finding for this variable: .64. This 
suggests that coding common knowledge details is somewhat subjective and not 
straightforward. Vrij et al. (2017) reported that disagreements between coders 
occurred because one coder missed a cue. Our coders had the same experience. 
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Table 1.  
Total Detail, New Detail, Proportion New Detail, Complications, Common Knowledge Details, and Proportion of Complications as a Function 
of Veracity.  
 
  
 Truth 
M (SD) 95% CI 
Lie 
M (SD) 95% CI 
F p (two-tailed) Cohen’s d  
[95% CI] 
 
Sketch       
Total detail 24.22 (13.75) [21.87,27.01] 22.67 (13.27) [19.56,24.70] 01.45 .229 0.11  
New detail 
Proportion new details 
19.12 (13.52) [19,56,24.70] 
0.76 (0.24) [0.70,0.81] 
14.92 (12.22) [12.22,17.18] 
0.62 (0.34) [0.56,0.67] 
05.51 
10.98 
.020 
.001 
0.33 
0.48 
 
Complications 1.70 (1.65) [1.43, 2.02] 1.15 (1.39) [0.80, 1.39] 08.34 .004 0.36  
Common knowledge details 0.41 (0.57) [0.28, 0.51] 0.77 (0.64) [0.69, 0.92] 22.95 < .001 0.60  
Proportion of complications 0.71 (0.28) [0.66, 0.81] 0.50 (0.37) [0.40, 0.55] 21.53 < .001 0.65  
       
       
       
Using drawings in Interpreter-based Interviews 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Hit Rates for total detail and proportions of complications as a function of Veracity. 
 Hit Rate χ2 Wilks’ λ p-value Canonical correlation  
 Truths 
(%) 
Lies 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
    
 
 
 
Sketch 
New detail (no sketch) 
New detail (sketch) 
Proportion of new detail (no sketch) 
Proportion of new detail (sketch) 
Complications (no sketch) 
Complications (sketch) 
Proportion of complications (no sketch) 
Proportion of complications (sketch) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
----- 
49.1 
----- 
69.8 
----- 
64.2 
57.1 
73.6 
 
 
 
 
----- 
74.5 
----- 
54.9 
----- 
72.5 
68.6 
64.7 
 
 
 
 
----- 
61.5 
----- 
62.5 
----- 
68.3 
63.0 
69.2 
 
 
 
 
 
00.03 
06.89 
02.70 
11.80 
00.27 
07.39 
06.05 
09.91 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
0.93 
0.97 
0.89 
1.00 
0.93 
0.94 
0.91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.875 
.009 
.100 
.001 
.603 
.007 
.014 
.002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.16 
.26 
.17 
.33 
.05 
.27 
.25 
.31 
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i Common knowledge details differ somewhat from the better known term ‘scripts’. In 
Schank and Abelson’s definition (1977, p.41) a script refers to a sequence of events 
(e.g., ‘John went to a restaurant. He ordered lobster. He paid the check and left’). The 
scripted events deception researchers refer to (Vrij et al., 2017, but see also Köhnken, 
2004; Sporer, 2016; Volbert & Steller, 2014) do not necessarily involve a sequence of 
events (e.g. ‘We went to the National Museum where we spent a few hours’). To 
avoid confusion with scripts, Vrij et al. (2017) called them common knowledge 
details. 
 
ii There was no difference in the number of details truth tellers and liars reported in 
these five questions, F(1, 202) = 0.42, p = .516, d = .09. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
